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EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS: AN ANALYSIS OF
CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS
Luis L. Granados*
The Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") has become
an important and controversial technique of corporate planning
since it first gained widespread popular attention. 1 The recent
experience of one company provides a good illustration. In 1975,
the South Bend Lathe Company stood on the. brink of being liquidated by its parent corporation after a series of loss years. Five
hundred people would have lost their jobs upon liquidation of
the company. But an Economic Development Administration
loan enabled the employees to set up an ESOP to purchase the
assets of the division and create a one hundred percent employee-owned corporation. Productivity shot up immediately,
the company began turning a profit, and the national media
heaped praise on what quickly became the greatest ESOP success story}1 Internal problems developed over the years, however,
in spite of the company's generally good business performance.
In the summer of 1980, the national media, which had originally
sung the praises of the South Bend Lathe ESOP, chortled when
the South Bend Lathe employee-owners "hit the bricks" in a
protracted and bitter strike. 8
The South Bend Lathe strike provided ammunition to the
critics who question the purported value of ESOP's in improving
employee productivity. These critics label the ESOP a "fable"
and charge that it harms employers, employees, and the government's ability to raise revenue without producing the positive
results intended by its establishment.' Advocates, however,
• Legislative Counsel, The ESOP Association of America. The opinions expressed in
this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The ESOP
Association of America.
' The first law specifically referring to the ESOP was the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 102(5), 87 Stat. 985 (1973).
• See, e.g., Ryan, How and Why U.S. Helped 500 Workers Take Ouer a Machine-Tool
Manufacturer, Wall St. J., August 16, 1976, at 28, col. 1.
• See, e.g., Trouble in Workers' Paradises, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 73.
• See, e.g., Subcommittee on Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Committee on Employee Benefits, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, ESOP's Foibles, 31 TAX
LAWYER 561 (1978).
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· claim that the ESOP has the potential to revolutionize the
American free enterprise system by establishing it upon a basis
of true justice and efficiency. 5
This article surveys the battle between the critics and advocates of the ESOP, and scrutinizes various proposals currently
being considered in the legislative arena. Part I examines the
philosophy and history of the ESOP, particularly focusing upon
the conceptual foundations provided by the writings of Louis
Kelso. Part II explicates the various functions performed by the
ESOP: as a tool of corporate finance, as an "in-house" market
for the sale of stock held by a company's shareholders, and as a
means of obtaining additional investment tax credit. Part III
analyzes critically six proposed improvements of the ESOP system from both the General Accounting Office's Report and the
proposed ESOP Improvements Act. This Part concludes that
while each of the six proposals has some merit, the effectiveness
of the proposals is limited by their failure to deal with more
than the tax aspects of the ESOP controversy.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF THE ESOP

A.

The Philosophy Behind the ESOP

Although the origins of the ESOP philosophy can be traced
back to the 19th Century writings of Johann Heinrich von
Thunen,6 the generally-recognized creator of the concept today
is the lawyer-economist Louis 0. Kelso. Kelso's Two-Factor
Theory: The Economics of Reality examines the production of
economic wealth,' arguing that there are two factors at work in
the production of goods and services: (1) an individual's labor,
and (2) physical tools, or capital. A machine which manufactures
widgets "produces" them in the same physical, legal, and moral
sense as a person who fashions them laboriously by hand. Naturally, the machine does not do all the work itself; at the very
• See, e.g., Note, Employee Stock Ownership PlallS: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975); Maxa, Can We All Own a Piece of the Rock?,"Wash.
Post, Dec. 10, 1978, (Magazine) at 4.
6
Employee Stock Ownership PlallS and General Stock Ownership Trusts, Hearings
on S. 3241, S. 3223, H.R. 13882 before the Senate Finance Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

531 (1978) (statement of Bert Metzger).
, L. KELSO & P. HETTER, Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967).
See also L. KELSO & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); L. KELSO & M.
ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS (1961).

FALL

1980]

Employee Stock Ownership Plans

17

least, a person is needed to turn it on. The machine, however, is
a separate, identifiable factor in the production of the widget.
Kelso's view contrasts directly with that of Karl Marx, who said
that labor is the only factor of production, and who viewed machines merely as "congealed labor."8 This difference is of more
than mere academic importance. The Kelsonian view leads to
the conclusion that the owner of the machine is justly entitled to
the wealth the machine creates, while Marx would say that the
laborers who built the machine are the ones who should receive
the wealth it creates. In a society where we have machines which
produce machines which produce still other machines, the "congealed labor" viewpoint leads to hopeless complication, and to
many observers lacks the common sense of the two-factor view.
Assuming for the moment that there are two factors of production, the next question concerns their relative importance.
Kelso argues persuasively that the Industrial Revolution must
be defined in terms of the steady shifting away from the labor
factor and toward the capital factor. While exact quantification
of the two factors' relative contribution is impossible, Kelso realistically estimates that as much as ninety percent of the work of
production is properly attributable to the capital side. If the
number of man-hours required to produce most goods and services without the benefit of modern technology were calculated
and compared with the number of man-hours presently required, in many cases the ninety percent figure would seem conservative. In any event, Kelso is almost certainly right that the
trend of modern technological development is toward an everincreasing role for the capital factor.
The fundamental contradiction in our economy, Kelso further
argues, is that our outtake system is "out of synch" with the
realities of our input system. The vast majority of people derive
their income almost solely from their contribution of labor, owning virtually no capital whatsoever. If there are truly two factors
of production and capital is in fact the ever-increasing factor,
and if the vast majority of participants in the economy are relegated to deriving their income from the ever-diminishing factor
of production, then it is little wonder that we have an economy
racked by tensions and periodic breakdowns.
There is no question but that the ownership of American capital is concentrated in the hands of the few. Federal government
figures show that one percent of the American people own over
fifty percent of privately-held corporate wealth, while six per• Kelso, Karl Marx: The Almost Capitalist, 43 A.B.A.J. 235 (1957).
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cent of the people own over seventy percent of it. 9 There is also
no question that this maldistribution causes much of the social
difficulty in America today. Kelso's and Marx's differing views
on the nature of production lead them to differing views on the
resolution of the maldistribution problem. Marx would expropriate capital property (away) from present owners, because he
does not concede their right to own it. Marx would ultimately
abolish the concept of property itself. Kelso, on the other hand,
says that the solution lies not in destroying the institution of
private property, but in spreading it out. Kelso maintains that
this should not be done by confiscating from the haves and giving to the have nots, since that would be inconsistent with his
view that property owners have a genuine right to their property. Instead, he focuses on the ownership of the future capital
wealth society will produce. 10 Virtually all of this growth is
financed by some variety of credit. Therefore, Kelso and his associates have devised various credit mechanisms which foster
broad ownership of newly-created wealth by average citizens, to
replace or at least supplement present mechanisms, which tend
to concentrate the ownership of new wealth into the hands of
the existing ownership base. The ESOP represents the most
well-known of the Kelsonian mechanisms.

B.

The History of the ESOP

The concept of broad ownership of productive capital runs
through the writings of the leading thinkers of the American
Revolution, and through the land policies of the first hundred
years of the nation's existence. 11 The Revenue Act of 1921 12 first
recognized the tax exempt status of stock bonus plans; five years
later, the tax exempt status of pension plans was similarly recognized.18 The Internal Revenue Service, in a 1953 Revenue Ruling, 14 first allowed leveraging by a stock bonus plan to provide
the employer with financing repayable with pretax corporate
9

STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF NEW CAPITAL: ESOP's AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 7 (Comm. Print 1976).
10
The Department of Commerce estimates that between $3 and $5 trillion of such
growth will be needed in the next decade. See U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, May 27,
1974, at 22-23.
11
See, e.g., Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain, 12
Stat. 392 (1862).
11
§ 219(0, 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1921).
13
Revenue Act of 1926, § 219(0, 44 Stat. 9, 33, 34 (1926).
14
Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 C.B. 287.
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dollars, laying the groundwork for the leveraged ESOP.
Kelso established his first ESOP in 1956, in order to save a
small newspaper from takeover by a national chain. Over the
next few years, the number of ESOP's grew very slowly, due to
unfamiliarity with the idea in business circles.
The much-needed breakthrough finally came in late 1973
when Kelso "converted" Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Russell Long. The Senator immediately pushed through an
amendment to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973-a
response to the collapse of the Penn Central-which would have
provided for employee ownership of the newly-created Conrail
Corporation. The bill as amended cleared the full Senate, but
the Conference Committee diluted the ESOP amendment to a
mere study, 111 which ultimately rejected the idea as impractical. 16
In 1974, a threat arose to the existence of the ESOP. The original versions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") would have prohibited an employer corporation from
extending its credit to an ESOP Trust to enable it to obtain a
loan for the purpose of acquiring employer securities. 17 This provision would have effectively eliminated the leveraged ESOP.
Senator Long, however, succeeded in amending this section of
ERISA to provide an exception for ESOP's. 18 Also in 1974, Senator Long amended the Trade Act to require a preference for
ESOP firms in the government's efforts to assist firms in foreign
trade impacted industries. Finally, Long continued his efforts in
1975 by championing the Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership
Plan ("TRASOP") in the Tax Reduction Act of that year. The
1976 Internal Revenue Service's proposed ESOP regulations 19
posed another threat: ESOP advocates claimed that the extremely restrictive regulations would have a "chilling effect" on
the establishment of ESOP's. Congress, however, publicly rebuked the IRS for attempting to frustrate congressional intent, 20
and spelled out exactly what form Congress wanted the regula'" See H.R. REP. No. 93-744, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in (1973) U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3306, 3310.
•• Joint Economic Committee, Hearings on Employee Stock Ownership Plans Before
the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-73 (1975). But see id. at 264-355
(rebuttal by L. Kelso and N. Kurland).
17
S. 1179, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
18
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
•• Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 54.4975-7(b), 54.4975-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,833 (1976). See· also
Department of Labor Prop. Reg. §§ 2550.407d-6, 2550.408b-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,870 (1976).
All four proposed regulations were later adopted with substantial amendments. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 54.4975-7(b), 54.4975-11 (1980), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.408b-3, .407d-5,
.407d-6 (1979).
•• See note 23 infra.
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tions to take. 21 The final regulations largely adhered to these
recommendations. In a Revenue Ruling in 1979, moreover, the
IRS took the significant step of recognizing the ESOP as a
"technique of corporate finance. " 22
The ESOP concept appears frequently in current legislation.
Besides technical amendments, 28 there is a growing trend in
Congress to tie federal aid to businesses to the establishment of
ESOP programs. For example, the controversial Chrysler bailout
bill24 and the 1979 legislation authorizing federal funding for
Conrail and the Delaware & Hudson Railway211 required establishment of an ESOP as a condition of federal assistance. The
Small Business Employee Ownership Act of 1980 authorizes the
Small Business Administration ("SBA") to provide loan guarantees to ESOP's for financing corporate growth; 26 the Act also expands on the SBA's loan authority by permitting loan guarantees to ESOP's for the purpose of acquiring fifty-one percent
control of a company. Further, the 1980 authorization bills for
the Economic Development Administration ("EDA") 27 would
have established a preference for ESOP projects in the allocation of EDA funds. 28 Finally, some states have attempted to encourage the growth of ESOP's. The states of Delaware, Maryland, Michigan and Minnesota have enacted legislation
favorable to the ESOP concept. 29 Maryland's "Broadened Ownership Act," for example, establishes support for the ESOP as
official state economic policy, and requires several state agencies
to report annually on their progress in implementing the policy.
Although states have moved into this area, most ESOP development will undoubtedly occur within the federal arena.
21
H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 539 (1976), reprinted in (1976) U.S.
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws 4118, 4234.
•• Rev. Rul. 79-122, 1979-1 C.B. 204, 206.
•• The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), and the Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat. 194 (1980), made a number of
technical modifications in the law relating to ESOP's. More technical amendments may
be added by the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980).
•• Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980).
•• Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-611, 92 Stat. 3089 (1978).
21
Pub. L. No. 96-302, 94 Stat. 833 (1980).
•• See The ESOP Association of America Newsletter, Nov. 1980, at 3.
•• Id.
•• 1979 Del. Laws J. Res. 20; 1979 Md. Laws J. Res. 1; 1980 Md. Laws, chs. 119, 598,
821, and 847; MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.751 (1980 Supp.); Act of March 15, 1974, ch.
157, 1974 Minn. Laws 233 (codified in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 290.01 92.04 (West 1967)).
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THE ESOP SYSTEM

Kelso and his associates have developed many new forms of
credit mechanisms to spread out the ownership of newly-formed
capital; the most well-known by far is the ESOP. The ESOP
gives a corporation's employees shares of stock in their employer
without requiring them to put up their own money for it. That
sounds like a giveaway, but it is not. Capital, unlike consumer
goods and services, pays for itself. As one of the two factors
which produces wealth, capital generates income. That income is
generally sufficient to repay the cost of acquiring the capital
within three to seven years. Responsible corporate managers
generally do not undertake capital projects unless they have
solid reason to believe that the project will pay for itself in that
amount of time. Thus, the ESOP is not a "giveaway"; the employees simply "pay for" the capital out of the earnings the capital itself generates. In other words, they "earn" their capital
accumulations by gaining access to the flow of future profits to
pay the cost of the capital being acquired.
In technical terms, an ESOP is a "stock bonus" plan, or a
"stock bonus" plan combined with a "money purchase" plan,
"qualified" under the Internal Revenue Code. A "stock bonus"
plan is simply a plan for compensating employees with stock instead of with cash; a "money purchase" plan is a plan in which
the employer contributes annually a fixed percentage of the employee's annual compensation. 30 "Qualified" means that the plan
complies with the participation, vesting, distribution, fiduciary
responsibility, reporting and disclosure, etc., rules of ERISA81
and Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Corporate contributions to stock bonus plans are deductible by the corporation; 32
employees are not taxed until they receive their benefits, usually
at retirement or other termination of employment. 33 ERISA
provides elaborate rules for all stock bonus and other types of
deferred compensation plans to follow, in order to protect the
interests of employees.
ao 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-l(b)(l)(iii) (1980).
11

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.)•
[hereinafter cited as "ERISA"].
11

I.R.C. § 404.

11

I.R.C. § 402.
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The Functions of the ESOP

The ESOP is a specialized type of stock bonus plan, because
ESOP's are permitted to borrow money to buy employer stock,
and the employer is permitted to guarantee such loans. 34 The
ESOP, while a very flexible device, has three principal functions:
(1) as a tool of corporate finance, often called the "leveraged
ESOP," whose distinguishing feature is the borrowing of funds
by the employee Trust to purchase newly-issued equity of the
employer company; (2) as an "in-house" market for the stock of
closely-held companies; and (3) as a means of obtaining an additional one and one-half percent Investment Tax Credit, in addition to the basic credit of ten percent of corporate investment in
"qualified" plant and equipment, as defined in Sections 46
through 50 of the Internal Revenue Code. ESOP's which take
advantage of the Investment Tax Credit provisions are often
called "TRASOP's," for "Tax Reduction Act [of 1975) Stock
Ownership Plan."
1. The ESOP as a tool of corporate finance-A hypothetical
example might help explain the finance function of the ESOP.
Suppose Corporation X wants to build a new plant for $10 million. Under conventional debt financing, it would simply borrow
the $10 million, provide sufficient guarantee of repayment to
satisfy the lender, use the money to build the plant, and then
use the profits from the new plant to pay back the lender. The
excess of the profits generated by the new plant over the payments made to amortize the loan makes the deal attractive to
the corporation.
ESOP financing adds a third entity to the transaction-an
ESOP Trust. The Trust, not the corporation, borrows the money
from the lender; the corporation guarantees that it will make
payments to the Trust in amounts sufficient to amortize the
loan. The Trust then uses the borrowed funds to purchase
newly-issued shares of employer stock, at fair market value as
determined by a qualified appraiser. That gets the money into
Corporation X, which uses it to build the new plant. The new
plant generates profits, which are used by Corporation X to
make payments to the Trust, which immediately uses the money
to repay its obligation to the lender. The payment schedule from
the Corporation to the Trust may be essentially the same as it
would be directly to the lender under conventional debt financu I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
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ing. 311 The corporate obligation is essentially the same whether or
not ESOP financing is used.
There is one big difference, however. In conventional debt
financing, debt repayments attributable to interest are deductible for tax purposes, but amounts attributable to repayment of
principal are not. All payments to the ESOP are deductible,
however, even those attributable to principal repayments. 36 This
makes quite a difference: given a fifty percent effective tax rate,
Corporation X will have to gross $20 million to repay the $10
million principal of the conventional loan, but need gross only
$10 million to repay the loan with pretax dollars through the
ESOP. That difference, plus the productivity improvements that
frequently accompany the ESOP, make the ESOP route seem
safer and more attractive from the lender's standpoint, and may
in some cases lead to faster amortization of the loan. 37
The employees of Corporation X receive their stock interests
according to the elaborate rules of ERISA and Subchapter D of
the Internal Revenue Code. First, the employee must become a
"participant" in the plan. 38 This is generally accomplished by
meeting the requirements specified in the plan, which may require up to one year 9f service and/or the attainment of age
twenty-five. (In most cases, the Corporation may exclude parttime employees from participation). Each year, the stock or cash
that has been contributed to the Trust (except for that which
has been debt-financed and not yet "paid for") is "allocated" to
the separate accounts of each participant. When the Trust has
acquired the stock with the proceeds of a loan, the stock is only
allocated to individual accounts as the loan is paid off; e.g., when
ten percent of the loan is repaid, ten percent of the stock is "released" for allocation. 39 This allocation is normally made proportionate to employee compensation, so that an employee who
earns $20,000 per year will receive an allocation twice as large as
an employee who earns $10,000 per year. The employee, however, is not fully entitled to his or her entire account. The pro•• Conrad, ESOP: Finance Tool, Employee Benefit, Pensions and Investments, Sept.
25, 1978, at 33, col. 1.
ae I.R.C. § 404(a).
37
If new stock has been issued, on the other hand, there will be a dilutive effect to the
calculation of earnings per share, since there will be an increase in the number of shares
outstanding which forms the denominator for the ratio. Whether or not this dilutive
effect will actually reduce the earnings per share from the pre-ESOP period depends
upon the rate of increase in company earnings-the numerator of the ratio-resulting
from the new investment.
.. I.R.C. § 410.
•• Pension Excise Taxes, 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-7(b)(8) (1980).
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portion to which the employee is entitled is determined by the
"vesting" schedule:' 0 There are a wide range of options for permissible vesting schedules, which can delay one hundred percent
vesting for up to fifteen years. In a typical plan, an employee
will be zero percent vested for his first three years of employment. After the third year the employee will become thirty percent vested, after the fourth year forty percent vested, up to the
tenth year, after which he or she will be one hundred percent
vested, or fully entitled to the stock which has been accumulating in his account each year. When the employees leave the company, they have the right to the value of the vested portion of
their account. They also have the right to demand the actual
shares,• 1 although in most closely-held companies both the employee and the employer prefer a distribution of the fair market
value of the shares in cash instead. If the employee does receive
shares, which are not of a type traded actively in securities markets, ESOP regulations guarantee a put-option to sell them back
to the company or the Trust for their fair market value, which
the company or Trust is permitted to pay in installments over a
five-year period. 42 The employee is not taxed on the allocation or
vesting of shares in his or her account, but is taxed at the time
of distribution, unless the employee immediately "rolls over"
the distribution into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). 48
Special ten-year income averaging is also available for lump-sum
distributions. 44
While the stock is held in the Trust, any dividends paid on it
can immediately be "passed through" to the employees to provide them with additional income. Alternatively, they can be
used to accelerate repayment of the loan, or used within the
Trust to purchase stock or other investments for purposes of liquidity.•11 In the case of a leveraged ESOP, voting rights on publicly-traded shares must be "passed through" to participants-in
the words of the statute, each participant in the plan must be
"entitled to direct the plan as to the manner in which employer
securities ... are to be voted." For non-publicly traded shares,
it is only necessary to pass through the voting rights "with respect to a corporate matter which (by law or charter) must be
decided by more than a majority vote of outstanding common
•• I.R.C. § 411.
0
I.R.C. § 409A(h).
•• Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(10) to (11) (1980).
0
1.R.C. § 402(a)(5).
•• I.R.C. § 402(e)(l).
•• Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1520, 1590.

FALL

1980)

Employee Stock Ownership Plans

25

shares voted." Such issues are typically "major" issues, such as
merger, liquidation, etc. 46
2. The ESOP: "in-house" market-With or without leveraging, an ESOP can be used as an "in-house market" for the sale
of stock held by a company's shareholders. Owners of closelyheld companies often have a difficult time finding a buyer for
their shares when they want to retire. An ESOP can be used to
create a buyer, keep the corporation in friendly hands, and boost
productivity-all at the same time.'"
Suppose the sole owner of Corporation X wants to convert
shares to cash over a period of years in anticipation of retirement. One course of action would be to sell out to a conglomerate, which has drawbacks that are by now well-known. 48 An alternative would be to establish an ESOP, according to the rules
described above. The Corporation would contribute cash each
year to the ESOP, which would use the cash to purchase shares
from the owner at fair market value. The owner is taxed at regular capital gains rates; by contrast, had the stock been sold directly back to the corporation, the owner may be taxed at much
higher dividend rates. 49 The owner need not pass through voting
rights except on extraordinary corporate issues, thus retaining
control of the company through his or her own stock plus the
right to select the trustees. If the owner wishes to sell out before
the Trust has sufficient money to pay him, the ESOP can simply
borrow the money to pay the owner with the corporation guaranteeing the loan.
3. Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plan-Some of the
three to four thousand companies which have established
ESOP's have taken advantage of a provision of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 to create something called a "TRASOP."60 That
provision has now been codified as Section 409A of the Internal
Revenue Code, and the name of the plan has been officially
changed to "Tax Credit Employee Stock Ownership Plan," although use of the term TRASOP persists. 61 This provision permits companies to take an additional one percent investment tax
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e) .

., See SENATE FINANCE COMM., 96TH CONG. 2D SEss., EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS: AN EMPLOYER HANDBOOK 23 (Comm. Print 1980) .
•• See HOUSE SMALL BUSINESS COMM., CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: THEIR EFFECTS ON
SMALL Bus1NEss AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, H.R. REP. No. 96-1447, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
•• The seller must comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 77-30 to qualify for
capital gains treatment. See 1977-2 C.B. 539.
00
Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301(d), 89 Stat. 38 (1975).
61
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
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credit for money or stock contributed to an ESOP (in lieu of
taking the deduction; a company cannot take both). That is, if a
company purchases property qualified for the investment tax
credit, and if it contributes employer securities to an ESOP as
defined in Section 409A, it can take an investment tax credit of
eleven percent, rather than the normal ten percent, of the qualified investments. Furthermore, the company can take yet an additional one-half percent credit, for a total of eleven and onehalf percent, to the extent that participants make voluntary
matching contributions to the Trust. This is very attractive to
companies eligible for the investment tax credit, because it is
essentially a free gift from the taxpayers to their employees.
Many ESOP proponents admit that this is an expensive and
inefficient way to promote the ESOP concept, but it has at least
accomplished its purpose of generating interest in the idea, as
well as providing additional incentive for capital formation.
TRASOP's are subject to several restrictions not imposed on
other ESOP's, such as a rule requiring immediate one hundred
percent vesting.
Ill. f>ROP0SED IMPROVEMENTS OF THE ESOP SYSTEM

A.

The General Accounting Office Report ·

The General Accounting Office ("GAO"), at the request of the
Senate Finance Committee, conducted a study of the operation
of ESOP's. The GAO issued a highly negative report in June,
1980, entitled Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Who Benefits
Most in Closely Held Companies? 53 The study covered thirteen
unnamed closely-held government contractor corporations that
had set up ESOP's, (although there is reason to believe that
some of the plans studied were not actually statutory ESOP's),C18
concluding that the interests of ESOP participants were adversely affected in several ways. First, the companies sold or
contributed stock to their ESOP's at inflated prices, based on
appraisal valuations that lacked independence and/or did not
properly consider all relevant factors. Overvaluation of stock is
•• THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: WHO BENEFITS MOST IN CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES? (HRD-80-88) (1980).
•• Id. at 22. Only 2 of the 13 plans studied contained the put option requirement
mandatory for all statutory ESOP's. This leads many observers to believe that the other
11 plans were simply conventional stock bonus plans.
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prohibited by ERISA,t~" tending to mislead participants about
the true value of their accounts. The report noted that the failure of the Department of Labor to publish valuation regulations
as contemplated by ERISA had contributed to the problem. Second, participants were generally not permitted to vote or direct
the voting of company stock allocated to their ESOP accounts.
The Rep9rt recommended legislation to require a full "passthrough" of voting rights on stock allocated to participant's
accounts.
Third, participants were not assured of a market for company
stock distributed by the ESOP. The possibility arose that employees might be given stock which became useless to them because they would be unable to find a buyer for it. The Report
recommended legislation to require plan provisions for
mandatory put-options, at fair market value, to be issued for all
company stock distributed from the plan. GAO also questioned
the contribution that ESOP's make to improving productivity,
called for a more vigorous program of ESOP audits, and in general implied that the whole ESOP concept is not worth the revenue loss it causes. Critics of the Report questioned both the
methodology employed and the objectivity of its standards of
evaluation.IHI Many of the GAO criticisms, however, point to
problems with current ESOP law which _deserve discussion.
1. The valuation of employer stock-The value assigned to
employer stock contributed or sold to an ESOP is critically important. If the ESOP trustee causes the plan to purchase stock
at a price greater than its true value, the purchase may be a
violation of fiduciary duties, rendering the trustee personally liable to the plan participants. 66 If the employer contributes stock
to an ESOP and claims a deduction117 based on an inflated price,
then the deduction will in part be disallowed. If the ESOP
purchases stock from a principal shareholder or the employer at
a price greater than fair market value, the seller is subject to an
excise tax of five percent of the amount involved;_ an additional
tax of one hundred percent is imposed if the transaction is not
"corrected."H Undervaluation can be as bad as overvaluation.
The law requires that for a leveraged ESOP, terminating particiERISA, supra note 31, § 408(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(d) (1976).
"" Memorandum from Ronald L. Ludwig, Chairman, Legal Advisory-Committee, The
ESOP Association of America, to Sen. Russell B. Long, July 16, 1980 (on file at University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) .
.. ERISA, supra note 31, §§ 404, 409, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1109 (1976) .
., I.R.C. § 404(a) .
.. I.RC. § 4975(a)-(b).
04

28

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 14

pants be given a put-option to sell the shares they receive back
to the employer or the plan at "fair market value."69 If the securities are undervalued, then the participant may have a cause
of action against the plan.
The law provides little guidance to the closely-held company
on how to value its stock for purposes of ESOP transactions. For
publicly-traded companies, the market price of the stock on the
appropriate day is the readily determinable measure of value. 80
But closely-held companies are given only the guidance of
ERISA Section 3(18)B defining "adequate consideration" for
prohibited transaction purposes as "the fair market value of the
asset as determined in good faith by the trustee or named fiduciary pursuant to the terms of the plan and in accordance with
regulations promulgated by the Secretary." These regulations,
however, have not yet been proposed, and their proposal does
not seem to be imminent.
This lack of standards puts ESOP companies in a predicament. Although today in practice a good faith independent appraisal will provide a certain degree of protection from liability,
employers still face legal sanctions if their valuation is too low,
and even stiffer sanctions if it is too high. Appraisers, while
roundly criticized by the GAO for failing to value stock properly,
have never been told what standards they are expected to apply.
Audits and lawsuits focusing on valuation have begun to proliferate, and the resulting confusion and uncertainty act as a deterrent to businessmen considering establishment of an ESOP.
In the absence of the promised ESOP valuation regulations,
practitioners have been relying on Revenue Ruling 59-60, which
discusses valuation of closely-held stock for estate and gift tax
purposes. As one valuation expert has aptly put it, this ruling is
"more philosophical than instructional. "81 It defines fair market
value as "the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is
not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts," and it lists eight factors which
should be considered in the computation. 82
•• Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(ll)(iii) (1980).
•• ERISA, supra note 31, § 3(18)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976).
•• EBPR Research Reports, vol. 28, no. 40, October 3, 1980 (Weekly News Digest), at 6
(statement of M. Lee).
•• Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. The eight factors are:
(a) The nature of the business and history of the enterprise from its inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
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The GAO Report described several cases in which the valuation of stock transferred to an ESOP could be questioned. 88 In
some instances, no one made an independent appraisal, and the
Board of Directors or some other interested party simply determined the valuation. In others, the GAO faulted the valuation
for failure to consider properly the relevant factors of Revenue
Ruling 59-60. One appraiser computed company earnings after
deleting the effect of a subsidiary for which the parent company
acted as guarantor to all debt and the subsidiary's entire line of
credit. Other appraisers used inconsistent approaches in different companies, such as capitalizing pretax earnings for some
companies and post-tax earnings for others, or capitalizing earnings before ESOP contributions in some cases, and after ESOP
contributions in others. One appraiser utilized four different
methods in four different years for the same company; a subsequent IRS-sponsored appraisal concluded that the value in one
of the years had been overstated by 632 percent.
In response to these valuation irregularities, GAO called on
the Department of Labor to issue valuation regulations "as soon
as possible."84 This suggestion has merit, as it would help to remove a cloud of uncertainty from the valuation area. But the
content of such regulations is, of course, at least as important as
the fact of their issuance. A poorly-designed set of regulations
for valuations of ESOP stock would make the ESOP a highly
unattractive tool for business planning; moreover, the 1976 attitude of the agencies to the ESOP concept raises fears about
future valuation regulations. If the Kelsonian vision of broad
private ownership is to be achieved, these valuation regulations
must be fair to ESOP companies and easily administered-otherwise, the growth of the ESOP will be slowed or
halted.
Fairness requires that the regulations not result in an undervaluation of an ESOP company's stock. There are numerous
ways in which this could happen, a full discussion of which
would exceed the scope of this article. But one example would
(d) The earnings capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(0 Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the bloc to be valued.
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a similar
line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market,
either on an exchange or over-the-counter.
Id.
•• GAO report, supra note 52, at 8-21.
14

Id. at 19..
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be the treatment of minority vs. majority voting blocs. Some valuation experts argue that where the ESOP only controls a minority interest in a firm, the value of the stock it holds should be
discounted by some arbitrary percentage to reflect this lack of
control. 611 Others contend that there should be a "premium" for
a controlling interest over and above the "straight" value of the
stock, rather than a discount for a minority interest,66 or that
there should be no adjustment at all based on the proportion of
shares held. Insofar as the multiplier used in the capitalization
of earnings approach is based on the price/earnings ratios of
similar but publicly-traded companies, it seems that the "minority discount" approach would lead to inaccuracies, when the
stock being traded is all held by minority interests. The important point is to keep in mind the congressional intent to encourage ESOP's in conjunction with important public policy reasons for doing so. Furthermore, the drafters should recognize
that erring on the side of undervaluation does not protect the
interests of employees. An employee who receives a put-option
to sell stock back to the company at a price lower than the stock
is actually worth has not been protected very well.
Fairness does not represent the only goal that the drafters
should keep in mind. Simplicity and ease of application are also
critically important. In the majority bloc vs. minority bloc issue
discussed above, simplicity would dictate that neither a premium nor a discount should be applied. Valuation is an art more
than it is an exact science, and as such it can be debated endlessly. But businessmen have no time for endless debate, nor can
they often afford to pay for a valuation study so thorough as to
mute all questioning and criticism. Businessmen need a readily
ascertainable number they can use to determine whether the
ESOP makes sense for the situation they are in; if they cannot
get such a number, however, they will lose interest in the ESOP.
This concern seems particularly important for small
businesses. 67
•• Address by J. Zukin, speech outline printed in course materials prepared for Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education Program, ESOPs,
TRASOPs, AND 0rHER EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (Sept. 20-21, 1979), at 14.
88
[1977] PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING (P-H) 11 1061.
•• The drafting of regulations governing the valuation of nonpublicly-traded stock for
ESOP purposes seems to provide a perfect example of a situation in which the new Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-1354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 601-12), should be applied. This Act recognizes that compliance with complex
regulations can be relatively more burdensome for small businesses than for large ones,
and requires agencies to develop alternative, simpler regulations to apply to small business. Nowhere is the need for simplification for small businesses greater than in the valu-
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Regardless of the ultimate decision on which valuation methods should be employed, there must be a change of attitude on
the part of the agencies overseeing the process. ESOP's are now
subjected to "special scrutiny" by the agencies, which translates
into "high likelihood of being audited." Such a policy naturally
diminishes the attractiveness of the ESOP for businessmen,
even though they may have every intention of valuing their
stock fairly. Much more appropriate, given the intent of Congress and the public policy arguments for encouraging the
ESOP, would be a more constructive attitude towards responding to requests for guidance, and exercising leniency for past actions where good faith can be shown. An important component
of this new attitude would be a willingness to issue "no-action"
letters with regard to the acceptability of valuations-a practice
the IRS now refuses to engage in. Such "no-action" letters
would provide employers with the certainty they require in the
conduct of a business. Another such component would be prospective application of any changes in a company's valuation
procedures which the IRS mandates after an audit, in cases
where good faith can be shown (e.g., where the appraisal has
been done by a truly independent professional appraiser). Prospective application, rather than the current practice of assessing for back taxes and penalties, would assure that businessmen
would not suffer the consequences from sanctions, while at the
same time assuring that proper procedures are used in the future. In short, a "crackdown" is not the answer; what is needed
is constructive guidance to those who do want to follow the law,
if only they could determine what it is.
2. Voting rights pass-through-An ESOP is set up as a trust
in which the trustees have legal ownership of the trust assets
and the beneficiaries have equitable ownership. As legal owners,
the trustees of a qualified plan generally have the right to exercise the voting power of the stock held by the trust, so long as
they do so under the fiduciary standards of trust law incorpoation area. A good starting point for such a discussion might center on what has been
called an "asset value approach," similar to book value except that it uses fair market
value of the assets instead of historical costs. This approach might also be more readily
understandable by employees than the capitalized earnings approach where the multi. plier is determined with reference to market fluctuations over which employees have no
control. An asset value approach would be inappropriate in many situations, however,
especially in a non-capital-intensive company. But in a large class of cases which ought
not be too difficult to define, an asset value approach would provide a useable (albeit
imperfect) measure of value. A regulation which defined this class of cases and permitted
use of an asset value approach therein would be consistent with the spirit of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
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rated in ERISA. 88 A special exception to this rule is made for
the ESOP, however, and for all other "eligible individual account plans" (e.g., stock bonus and profit-sharing plans) in
which more than ten percent of the assets are invested in employer stock. 89 If a statutory ESOP or TRASOP holds publiclytraded employer stock, each participant must be entitled to direct the trustees how to vote the employer stock allocated to his
or her account on all corporate issues. If any "eligible individual
account plan" holds non-publicly traded employer stock, each
participant ~ust be entitled to direct the trustees how to vote
the stock in his or her account on corporate issues which, by
state law or by corporate charter, must be decided by more than
a majority of the outstanding common shares voted. 70 Typically,
such issues involve major corporate changes such as mergers or
dissolutions. The new Small Business Employee Ownership
Act71 and the proposed regulations thereunder72 would impose
even more stringent standards on ESOP's seeking to qualify for
Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan guarantees.
ESOP's holding even non-publicly traded stock would have to
"pass through" voting rights on all corporate issues. Of course,
once participants receive their stock distribution in any case,
they become the legal as well as the equitable owner of the
stock, thereby acquiring the right to vote it in the normal
manner.
While there is little criticism of the pass-through requirements
for publicly traded stock, almost no one is happy with the present arrangement for closely-held stock. Many closely-held
ESOP employers are adamantly opposed to any such passthrough whatsoever. On the other hand, the GAO,78 the Treasury Department,7 ' and others711 recommend that there be full
voting rights passed through on all corporate issues. The issue,
unfortunately, has become an emotional one, with repeated as88
ERISA, supra note 31, § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1975).
•• I.R.C. § 401(a)(22).
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e).
11
Pub. L. No. 96-302, 94 Stat. 850 (1980).
•• 45 Fed. Reg. 61,637 (1980) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. §§ 122, 202-7).
•• GAO report, supra note 52, at 24.
•• Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe
Benefits of the Senate Finance Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1979) (statement of
Daniel Halperin, Deputy Ass't Sec. for Tax Policy, Dep't of Treasury).
•• See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Provide
for the Non-Recognition of Gain on the Proceeds from the Sale of Small Business Stock
to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan if those Proceeds are Reinvested in such Stock:
Hearings on H.R. 7604 and H.R. 7606 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of N. Kurland).
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sertions on both sides substituting for rational analysis. Such an
analysis is badly needed if the ESOP movement is to avoid being sidetracked by the voting rights controversy.
The arguments in favor of voting rights pass-through are
straightforward. Since control is a fundamental attribute of
ownership, the proponents argue, a stock "ownership" program
which does not convey voting rights is a fraud. If the employees
are truly to share in the rights and responsibilities of capital
ownership, and if a substantial portion of their capital (and thus
of their future financial security) is to be tied up in the ESOP,
then they should have a say in how that capital is to be managed. Furthermore, the pass-through proponents argue, if one of
the goals of the ESOP is to improve employee motivation, participation, and productivity, then voting rights pass-through is a
must, for without it there would be no real change in the "wage
serr' status of the employees. Those opposed to voting rights
pass-through, however, counter with a number of equally strong
arguments. The right to have a say in the company cannot be
accomplished by voting rights, they argue, in the vast majority
of closely-held ESOP cases where the principal owners retain a
controlling interest in the firm. Pass-through in such cases
would be a meaningless ritual, since the outcome of the vote is
predetermined. The opponents also dismiss the productivity impact of voting rights pass-through. They point to the utter _lack
of empirical proof that the legalistic exercise of voting rights has
any effect on productivity, 78 arguing that pass-through is only
one of many ESOP-related steps a firm could take to enhance
employee participation. The South Bend Lathe strike, discussed
in the introduction, has been used as an example of what is
wrong with the ESOP; but since the South Bend Lathe ESOP
did in fact pass-though voting rights on all corporate issues, it is
actually an example of a case where pass-through of voting
rights did not improve the operation of the firm.
The leading argument against voting rights pass-through,
however, is the dampening effect it would have on the growth of
the ESOP. Many owners of closely-held companies have devoted
their careers to building up their firms and are willing to share
the fruits of their success with their employees; but they are not
willing to give up control of their assets. Understandably, these
•• See Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (Report to
the Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Project No.
99-6-09433, 1979). A regression analysis of the firms studied in this project actually
sho"'.ed a negative relationship between voting rights and profitability.
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owners see themselves as best able to run the company, and are
reluctant to turn over control of the assets on which their own
personal financial health hinges to a group of often less-educated
employees who, pre-ESOP, at least, have shown little interest in
the success of the company. The owners fear the prospect of
"management by committee," even though pass-through would
not necessarily lead to this. They also recognize the potential
conflict of interest on the part of employee-owners who have the
power to set their own wages. Theoretically, such employees
might choose to plow all of the company's profits into wage increases, leaving nothing for the equity owners of the company
who are not employees.
Two other important practical considerations arise in a consideration of voting rights pass-through for small, closely-held
companies: (1) the added paperwork and procedural burdens,
and (2) the disclosure of confidential information. The IRS has
not yet issued regulations to interpret the statutory require- ·
ment, although proposed regulations on this subject are expected to be issued soon. In 1979, the IRS issued regulations
governing voting rights pass-through for TRASOP's, and ESOP
companies have been relying on them for guidance. 77 The forthcoming regulations could possibly put closely-held ESOP companies in the same position as publicly-held companies in terms
of procedural requirements for proxy voting, etc., as set forth in
state corporate law;78 the employer or the ESOP trustees would
also be subjected to liability for technical violations of these extensive requirements. Closely-held companies, moreover, might
have to make the same information disclosures to their employee-owners that publicly-held companies are required by corporate and federal and state securities laws to make to outside
shareholders, and the same types of liability would attach for
misstatements or omissions in the information disclosed. 79 The
time, the expense, the subjection to liability and the loss of confidentiality entailed by these requirements are major reasons
why many businesses prefer to remain closely-held rather than
"going public." If installing an ESOP resulted in these kinds of
headaches for all closely-held business managers, then we could
expect to see a curtailment in the number of new ESOP's~ 80
77
Treas. Reg. § 1.46-8(d)(i) (1980).
•• See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-333 to 33-339 (West 1960, Supp. 1980).
•• See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
80
A recent internal survey by the ESOP Association of America, the national trade
association of ESOP companies, indicated the intensity of employer opposition to the
pass-through requirement. See The ESOP Association of America Newsletter, Sept.,
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The appeal of the arguments on both sides of the passthrough question, along with the controversy and bitterness it
has engendered, suggest the importance of searching for some
sort of new "middle ground," providing employee-owners some
say in management without causing the serious problems resulting from the present arrangement. This article does not recommend any one specific compromise position; discussion of such a
compromise, however, might begin with a consideration of one
or more of the following elements:
a. Reflect the lack of voting rights pass-through in the valuation of the stock. Suppose Smith has a share of XYZ Corporation stock in her ESOP account which she cannot vote until she
receives her distribution at retirement, and Jones has an identi- .
cal share of stock which he can vote while it remains in his
ESOP trust accunt. Arguably, what Jones has is "worth" more
than what Smith has, since he has more extensive legal rights. If
so, then Smith's share should have a lower valuation than
Jones', and XYZ should receive a lesser tax deduction for its
contribution of Smith's share to the ESOP than it does for its
contribution of Jones' share. This analysis could resolve the
whole pass-through controversy by simply requiring an arbitrary
discount (e.g., fifteen to twenty percent) to be applied to the valuation of employer stock held by the ESOP if the plan does not
provide for voting rights pass-through. The discount would
apply for purposes of corporate contributions to the plan, but
would not apply for plan transactions with third-party sellers, or
to terminating employee sales of stock back to the company or
the plan. ESOP's which did choose to pass through voting rights,
however, would not be subject to the discount requirement.
b. Pass-through voting rights on vested shares only. Most
ESOP's have a "vesting" schedule which provides that employees .who quit before normal retirement age may have to forfeit
some or all of the shares allocated to their account. Under
ERISA, employees may have to participate in the ESOP for as
long as fifteen years before they are fully vested in the shares
allocated to their account. 81 Yet voting rights pass-through today is based on allocated stock, rather than on vested stock,
which can lead to the anomaly of a participant casting votes to
affect the future of a company using stock which will be for1980, at 1. Eighty-three percent of the respondents recommended that it be repealed,
and 65 percent offered to lobby their representatives in Congress to that end. Many of
the respondents indicated that they planned to terminate their ESOP's, or to curtail
drastically their levels of contribution.
•• I.R.C. § 411.
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feited on the following day. Restricting pass-through to vested
stock would make it somewhat more palatable to employers,
while still giving employee-owners, especially those who have
demonstrated a longer-term commitment to the company, a say
in how the company should be run.
c. Limit the issues on which voting rights must be passedthrough. This approach is actually the one being used now for
closely-held companies, although the delineation of the issues on
which the vote must be passed-through is not a very satisfactory
one. Pass-through is required "with respect to a corporate matter which (by law or charter) must be decided by more than a
majority vote of outstanding common shares voted."82 Such issues are generally "major" ones, such as merger or liquidation.
Pass-through advocates are dissatisfied because such issues come
up rarely, if ever, in most companies; employers are dissatisfied
because such issues are precisely the ones where their need for
control and the danger of making a mistake are the greatest.
Furthermore, since in some states a super-majority is required,
these represent issues on which an ESOP with a minority interest could frustrate the will of the majority.
A different type of limitation on issues subject to pass-through
might be more desirable for both groups. One example would be
to permit the ESOP participants only to elect one or more board
members, possibly (though not necessarily) in proportion to the
number of shares held by the ESOP. The debate between the
merits of a "republican" form of government as opposed to a
"pure democracy" is an old one; this proposal would assume that
the republican form is most appropriate for tlie employee ownership situation. (Or at least it would assume that the republican
form is all that should be required; companies could elect to
open some or all issues to employee-owner vote, at their discretion). Under this scenario, employee-owners would not have to
evaluate complex and critical issues of corporate policy. They
would simply have to choose one or more trusted, capable representatives to the body that does deal with these issues. This proposal would greatly cut down on the need for disclosure of information and complex proxy voting procedures. It may also be less
threatening than the present law to managements considering
the establishment of an ESOP. And, whether the employers realize it now or not, this arrangement may also provide them with
a mechanism for receiving valuable input from their employees
which they are not now benefiting from.
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e).
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d. Statutorily limit the amount of paperwork and disclosure
required for the exercise of whatever voting rights must be
passed-through. If closely-held ESOP companies are ever subjected to the same types of paperwork, disclosure, and liability
as publicly-held companies in the area of stock voting, the attractiveness of the ESOP will be substantially diminished. Even
the threat that such a regulation might someday be imposed creates an uncertainty which can deter a small businessman from
setting up an ESOP. A meaningful statutory limitation on the
amount of paperwork and disclosure required in connection with
voting rights pass-through, standing alone, would probably not
be enough to satisfy businessmen's objections to the ESOP, but
in conjunction with one or more of the other proposals listed
here, it would help. A right to inspect certain corporate records
might be considered as an alternative to a general disclosure
requirement.
e. Limit pass-through to cases in which the ESOP owns a
majority of company stock. In the typical company, passthrough is a meaningless and costly ritual, since the principal
owner retains more than enough stock to win every vote. A law
recognizing this simple fact would save ESOP companies a considerable amount of aggravation and expense without in any way
depriving employees of control they might otherwise have
exercised.
f. Limit pass-through to stock which has been acquired with
some form of government subsidy. The case for pass-through
seems to be stronger when direct government subsidies, such as
SBA or EDA loan guarantees or extra tax credits, have been
used to enable the ESOP to acquire employer stock. A possible
compromise might be to require full pass-through in these cases,
but not require pass-through in other cases where the company
only receives from the government a tax deduction for amounts
expended to compensate its employees.
g. Provide a more generous "grandfather clause." Many
businessmen are particularly incensed because they established
ESOP's under one set of laws, only to have the laws changed by
the Revenue Act of 1978 to require voting rights pass-through
by closely-held companies. A provision exempting all ESOP's established before a certain date in the future (e.g., January 1,
1985) from the mandatory pass-through requirement would satisfy this particular objection.
h. Permit certain other types of worker participation models to substitute for voting rights pass-through. Voting rights
may not be the only way or even the best way for workers to
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exercise the proper degree of control over their workplaces.
Scanlon plans and Japanese-style quality control circles88 have
been used in many companies to boost productivity and to provide workers with the dignity that advocates of pass-through
hope to achieve. The law could be written to provide that a
good-faith effort to establish and operate such a plan would exempt an ESOP company from the pass-through requirement.
Such a law would be harder to monitor, but the difficulty in doing so would not be insurmountable. The law, moreover, would
provide companies with more flexibility, and encourage the
growth of another movement which seems to hold great promise
for the American economy. The requirement of Section 505 of
the Small Business Employee Ownership Act84 that "there will
be periodic reviews of the role in the management of such concern of employees to whose accounts stock is allocated," and the
requirement in the proposed regulations 811 interpreting this Act
that such review be annual, are healthy and constructive steps in
this direction.
i. Provide for additional ESOP incentives to counterbalance
the disincentives of voting rights pass-through. If Congress
wants to encourage ESOP's but require pass-through all at the
same time, they should make the ESOP so attractive that businessmen would be willing to endure voting rights pass-through
in order to have one. There are many ways that have been discussed in which this could be done, e.g., establishing a twotiered Federal Reserve discount rate which would lead to the
ready availability of a three percent prime rate for bank loans to
ESOP's. 88 Some would argue, however, that these proposals are
meritorious in their own right and that ESOP firms should not
have to pass-through voting rights in order to get them.
These proposals are, of course, not the only ways in which the
voting rights pass-through dilemma might be resolved. Some
combination of the above proposals, however, can be developed
to satisfy most of the concerns that have stunted the growth of
the ESOP. The resolution to this dilemma requires a retreat
from emotionalism on both sides and a careful crafting of an
•• See Hearings on Quality of Production and Improvement in the Workplace, Before
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 123-33
(1980) (statement of William Tanaka).
.. Supra note 26.
"" 45 Fed. Reg. 61,638, 61,640 (1980) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. § 122.206(c)).
18
See Kurland, Kelsonian Monetary Weapons for Fighting Inflation, reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 3056-Small Business Employee Ownership Act Before the Subcomm.
on Access to Equity Capital and Business Opportunities of the House Small Business
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-29 (1979).
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appropriate method by which employee-owners can exercise control over their capital.
3. Marketability of employer stock-Another GAO criticism
of ESOP's in closely-held companies concerned the ability of
ESOP participants to sell their shares once they receive their
distributions. IRC. Section 409A(h) requires that when non-publicly traded stock is acquired with the proceeds of a loan to the
ESOP, (a "leveraged ESOP"), the stock must be subject to a
"put-option" permitting the recipient to sell it back to the employer or trust, at specified times, at fair market value. For stock
acquired by a means other than an acquisition loan, however, no
such put-option is required. While most companies realize that
they have a moral obligation to repurchase unmarketable stock
distributed to their employees, there exists no legal requirement
for them to do so in a nonleveraged ESOP. This lack of a requirement may tempt companies into offering less than fair
market value for their employees' stock. GAO's study of thirteen
companies did find one case in which such an unfair purchase
occurred. 87
GAO recommended that Congress require a put-option at fair
market value on all nonpublicly traded stock distributed from
an ESOP. 88 This suggestion, while addressing a real problem
with good intentions, does not fit the need precisely. The proposal, on the one hand, does not go far enough. Nonpublicly traded
stock can be distributed just as easily from a conventional stock
bonus plan or a profit sharing plan as from an ESOP, yet the
GAO does not suggest that any steps be taken to remedy this
situation. Any extension of the legal requirements for marketability of stock distributed from a qualified plan should be broad
enough to cover all such plans, not just ESOP's. Otherwise, the
ESOP will be discriminated against vis-a-vis other types of
plans. The GAO suggestion, on the other hand, may go too far in
protecting the interests of the terminating employee, with the
effect of jeopardizing the interests of the employees who remain
in the plan. The put-option as presently constituted is not the
only way, nor necessarily the best way, in which marketability of
the employer stock may be assured. Before the Revenue Act of
1978, the duration of the put-option was for a full fifteen months
after the employees received their stock. Employees had every
right to wait until just the right point when they could get the
highest possible price for selling the stock back to the company
87
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GAO report, supra note 52, at 23.
Id. at 27.
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or the plan; the employer had no choice but to buy it back
within fifteen months of the distribution. Although beneficial
from the terminating employee's standpoint, this situation
seemed less appealing from the company or the plan's standpoint, since it might have to pay a higher price for the stock
than it would prefer to. The Senate Conference Report to the
Revenue Act of 1978 relaxed that requirement somewhat by
breaking the time period during wich the put-option could be
exercised into two parts. Under the terms of the Senate Report,
the option extended for six months after the employee received
the stock. It then lapsed, until the end of the employer's tax
year, when the valuation of the stock would be updated. After
being advised of this new valuation, the terminating employee
would then be given an additional three months in which to exercise the put-option. At the end of this period, the option
expired.
An approach could be devised which would be both simpler
and fairer to the employer and plan, and at the same time resolve the marketability problems highlighted by the GAO Report. Under this approach, a terminating employee would simply
be given the option at termination of receiving the stock or its
fair market value (as of the most recent valuation) in cash. Existing rules permitting distributions in installments would be
preserved in order to help ensure plan liquidity. There would be
no extended period of time in which the terminating employees
could "speculate" as to the direction of the stock price; they
would simply make up their minds at the time of termination.
A special problem arises in the case of a company entirely, or
almost entirely, owned by its employees, which wants to remain
that way. Such a company might well want to have the right to
repurchase stock for itself or its plan from employees who terminate, thus keeping all of the stock "in the family." Unfortunately, under present ESOP regulations the company cannot be
assured of this right. Although a right of first refusal on the
stock distributed from the plan is permitted, this is not enough
to provide such a guarantee. The employee cannot be compelled
to sell his stock back to the employer or the Trust; moreover, if
an outside party offers more for the stock than the employer or
Trust is willing to pay, the ESOP's control position can be substantially eroded.
Legislation along the lines of a bill introduced in the 96th
Congress, H.R. 7848, ought to be enacted which would, in the
case of an ESOP that owned all or substantially all of the employer's stock, permit the Trustees to decide whether stock or its
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equivalent fair market value in cash would be distributed to the
employee upon termination. This flexibility is presently denied
to ESOP's on the grounds that a "stock ownership plan" should
permit an employee, who so desires, to actually own the stock
outright at some point. While this may be a legitimate consideration in the typical ESOP which only owns a small portion of
the company, such legitimacy fades when weighed against the
continuity objectives of the one hundred percent ESOP-owned
company-the law should recognize this distinction.

B.

The ESOP Improvements Act

Unimpressed by the GAO's assertions, in July of 1980, Senator Long introduced S. 2982, the "Employee Stock Ownership
Improvements Act of 1980."89 The bill stood little chance of passage because of the congressional preoccupation with the stalemate on the general tax-cut legislation, but is important nonetheless because it brought together a number of tax proposals
that would provide an enormous stimulus to the growth of the
ESOP movement. In a speech about his proposals on September
26, 1980, Long flatly declared that "In the long run, I think they
all will pass. " 90 Among the more significant provisions of the bill
are sections which would expand the TRASOP by giving employers an alternative tax credit equal to one percent of their
covered payroll, as an alternative to the present formula of one
percent of investments qualified for the investment tax credit;
provide a corporate deduction for dividends paid on employee
stock held by an ESOP or TRASOP; and provide for "tax-free
rollover" (a deferral of taxation) on sales of small business stock
to an ESOP or TRASOP, if the sale proceeds are reinvested in
other small business stock within eighteen months.
1. The payroll-based ESOP tax credit-The ESOP Improvements Act contains a number of provisions intended to increase dramatically the incentive for business to establish
ESOP's. The Tax Reduction Act of 1980 approved by the Senate
Finance Committee on September 15 incorporated one of these
provisions, the payroll-based ESOP tax credit. 91 This provision
•• S. 2982, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; see also 118 Cong. Rec. S. 10018 (daily ed. July 18,
1980) (statement of Sen. Long). Earlier introduced as S. 1240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
[hereinafter cited as the ESOP Improvements Act).
80
Pens. Rep. (BNA) October 6, 1980, at A-24.
11
SENATE FIN. COMM., REP. ON H.R. 5829, TAX REDuCTioN ACT ov 1980, S. REP. No.
940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-05 (1980).
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would extend the benefits of the TRASOP to labor-intensive employers. Under present law, the TRASOP credit is tied to the
investment tax credit. A company can take an investment tax
credit of ten percent of its investment in certain qualified depreciable property. 92 It can also take an additional one percent
credit if it transfers employer securities equal in value to one
percent of its qualified investment to the TRASOP, or if it
transfers an equivalent amount of cash to the TRASOP which is
used by it to purchase employer securities. 93 The company can
take yet another one-half percent credit, for a total credit of
eleven and one-half percent, to the extent that employees make
"matching" contributions to their TRASOP accounts. 04
Hundreds of companies, including many in the Fortune 1000,
have established TRASOP's91 to take advantage of what is essentially a "free gift" from the taxpayers to their employees. By
its nature, however, a TRASOP is only useful to a company that
can take a significant amount of investment tax credits. If the
qualifying investments for such credits are not very large, then
one and one-half percent of them that would go into the
TRASOP would be so miniscule that it would not be worth the
trouble of setting up the plan. The vast majority of American
companies do not have enough qualifying investment to make
the TRASOP worthwhile.
A provision in the Tax Reduction Act of 1980 would permit ·
employers to take a tax credit based on a percentage of their
covered payroll, as an alternative to basing the credit on qualifying investment. The percentage would be one-half percent for
1981, three-quarters percent for 1982, and one percent for 1983,
after which the credit would expire unless extended or made
permanent by the Congress. This would enable all employers to
establish a TRASOP with a meaningful (though not large)
amount of stock in each employee's account. Capital-intensive
companies, however, would still receive more favorable treatment under the tax code by retaining the option of basing their
credit on qualifying investments, should that result in saving
them a larger amount. The IRS has suggested that if the payroll-based credit is adopted, then the investment-based credit
I.R.C. §§ 38, 46.
•• I.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2)(E), 48(n)(l)(A).
04
1.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2)(E), 48(n)(l)(B) .
.. Hewitt Associates, Survey of Tax Reduction Act ESOP's, April, 1979, reprinted in
Course Materials for Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education
Program, ESOP's, TRASOP's, and Other Employee Stock Ownership Plans (1979).
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should be repealed. 98 This suggestion makes a good deal of
sense.
The tax credit approach in general seems to be a very expensive way to go about encouraging employee ownership. Federal
revenues must be decreased by one dollar for every dollar of employee ownership created. Certainly, there is a sharply defined
upper limit on how far the federal government can go with this
approach. The IRS estimated that a bill similar to S. 2982 could
cost the government over $4 billion dollars annually by 1985. 97 •
There may well be other ways in which the government can encourage employee ownership without incurring such a large revenue loss, which would be preferable to expanding the use of tax
credits. On the other hand, by extending a "taste of ESOP" to
companies and workers who would otherwise not have considered it, the payroll-based credit may spread enthusiasm for the
concept which will lead to expansion beyond the amounts for
which the credit is available. Furthermore, if there is to be a
general tax-cut in 1981, it is only appropriate that employee
ownership be one of the causes benefited by the cut; the payrollbased tax credit is certainly a direct way to go about accomplishing this purpose.
·
2. Dividend deductibility-Another section of the ESOP Improvements Act would begin the process of re-defining the nature of the American business corporation in a very healthy and
constructive manner. The provision looks innocent enough; it
simply provides that dividends paid on employer securities held
by an ESOP be tax-deductible to the employer corporation if
they are distributed currently to the participants, as is possible
under an ESOP. 98 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
the revenue impact of this proposal as "indeterminate but
should be small." The philosophical implications, nonetheless,
are enormous. In effect, this section would end double taxation
of the corporate profits of employee owners.
Under the Kelsonian view, the owner of capital ought to be
entitled to receive the income his or her capital produces. Since
the pretax annual earnings on invested capital generally exceed
twenty percent, 99 the average citizen should be able to obtain
credit to purchase capital, repayable in a reasonably short
period of time with the earnings created by that capital. Two
.. Supra note 74, at 227.
01

Id.

.. Supra note 89.

" L. KELso & P. HETrER,
note 7, at 76.

Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY, supra
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"filters," however, interfere with the flow of earnings back to the
capital owner. One of these is the corporate law doctrine expressed in the landmark case of Dodge u. Ford Motor Co., 100 to
the effect that stockholders may not generally compel corporate
management to pay out earnings in the form of dividends. Kelso
vehemently disagrees, maintaining that this holding undermines
the institution of private property. 101 The other "filter" blocking
the free flow of capital earnings back to capital owners is the
double taxation of corporate profits. Capital earnings are taxed
at federal rates of forty-six percent plus whatever state-level
rates apply at the corporate level; the remaining earnings wich
pass from the corporation to its owners in the form of dividends,
are taxed a second time at unearned income rates as high as seventy percent at the federal level, plus whatever state tax rates
apply. Since little earnings remain to repay the loan used to acquire the stock, most average citizens could not obtain such a
loan. Thus we have the historic irony of a populist-inspired tax
system which actually serves to prevent any real broadening of
the ownership of capital wealth.
The ESOP as it stands today goes part of the way toward restoring the rights of capital owners by permitting (in essence)
corporate tax-free financing, as discussed earlier in this article.
Dividend deductibility would carry the process one step further,
by eliminating the corporate level tax on capital earnings paid
out to the capital owners. Thus, a corporation which earned one
million dollars and paid all of it out in dividends would pay no
corporate level tax. This would still not solve the problem created by the Dodge doctrine, but it would be a step in the right
direction. 102
The IRS opposes this proposal of the ESOP Improvements
Act on the grounds that it is a piecemeal approach to the overall
question of the integration of corporate and personal income
taxes now being studied, and that ESOP's should not receive
100

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
L. KELso & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO, supra note 7, at 210-213.
••• Kelso's view of the corporation is best exemplified in Subchapter U of the Internal
Revenue Code, added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
This chapter authorizes the creation of something called a "General Stock Ownership
Corporation," ("GSOC"). The GSOC would be a taxfree business operation, specially
chartered by a state and owned by the citizens of that state on an individual basis, which
is required to pay out at least ninety percent of its earnings in the form of dividends to
its stockholders. Many non-Kelsonian economists agree that an economy where full dividend payout was the norm would operate its capital markets more efficiently, rather
than having capital earnings tied up by corporate managements with an interest in having those earnings plowed back into their own companies. See J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY,
EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1980).
1 1
•
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special treatment in this area. 108 The IRS position fails to recognize the ownership-broadening purpose of the provision. By limiting integration to ESOP's, the bill would tip the scales in favor
of broadened ownership, in furtherance of a policy which ought
to be central to American economic planning in the 1980's. The
"overall integration" proposals now under consideration by the
IRS would largely take the form of tax credits to individuals for
dividends received; such a plan would set the existing distribution of capital wealth in concrete. Furthermore, the IRS ignores
the important productivity impact of the proposal. If dividend
payments to employees become "painless" they can be used as a
sort of immediate cash bonus system tied directly to company
earnings and to the employee's ownership stake in the company.
More companies will be able to move toward the model pioneered by the Allied Plywood Corporation in Virginia, where
workers receive generally three times as much in variable-level
dividends and bonuses as they do in fixed wages. 104 This set-up
leads to an unusually well-motivated workforce, as well as to a
healthier corporate financial picture because of the lower fixed
costs. It also provides insurance against layoffs, since the company can simply cut its dividends and bonuses in lean months.
The problem with the dividend deductibility provision in the
bill is that it does not go far enough. For a one hundred percent
ESOP-owned firm, the bill would be of great benefit, because it
would become completely "painless" to pay out dividends. But
in the much more common situation where the ESOP holds only
a minority interest, the firm will still be reluctant to declare dividends because the majority of those dividends would not be deductible. The company could issue a separate class of stock to
the Trust and simply pay dividends on that class to avoid this
problem. This is a complicated and somewhat messy solution because among other things, it would raise new problems of valuing the stock. If the ESOP class of stock is more likely to receive
dividends than the original class of stock, then it might well
have an even higher value than the original class. How much
higher? That would depend on the company's dividend-paying
policies, which could change over time, thus changing the basis
for the differing valuations between the two classes of stock.
Further-more, outside holders of the original class of stock might
••• Hearings on Private Pension Plans, supra note 74, at 216.

'°' Hearings on H.R. 3056-Small Business Employee Ownership Act Before the Subcomm. on Access to Equity Capital and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979) (statement of N. Kurland).
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become justifiably upset if they saw the employee-owners being
paid substantial dividends while they themselves were receiving
little or nothing.
Another solution, which would require a change in the ESOP
Improvements Act, would be to define an "ESOP company" as a
company with a specified percentage of employee ownership,
e.g., twenty percent (or, perhaps, twenty percent in 1981, to be
increased by one percent each year thereafter for the next thirty
years). For such companies, all dividends paid would be deductible. In addition to the advantages listed so far, this approach
would also create a powerful incentive for existing owners to set
up ESOP's to get dividend deductibility for their own stock. If
Congress is not willing to go quite this far, it should at least
consider amending the bill to provide for deductibility on stock
distributed to terminating employees from the ESOP.
Yet another approach would avoid use of the term "dividend"
altogether. There is nothing to prevent a company from paying a
quarterly or monthly cash bonus to employees, the overall size of
which would be tied in some way to company profitability, and
taking a business expense tax deduction for the payment. If the
IRS, however, determined that such payments were made substantially in proportion to the stock holdings of the employees,
even within the ESOP, then in all probability the deduction
would be disallowed because the payments would be treated as a
constructive (or "sham") dividend. If the Internal Revenue Code
were amended to permit the payment of such bonuses in proportion to employees' stakes in the ESOP, the double tax would be
avoided by this somewhat circuitous route. Dividend deductibility would be a much "cleaner" approach, however.
3. Tax free rollover-Perhaps the most significant change
that would be made by the ESOP Improvements Act is one that
would have only a minimal revenue impact. Section 11 of the bill
would provide for optional nonrecognition of gain on the sale of
small business stock to an ESOP, if within eighteen months the
proceeds are reinvested in the stock of another small business.
The gain would not be recognized until the stock acquired with
such proceeds had been sold. At that time, the gain would be
measured from the shareholder's original basis in the shares sold
to the ESOP. The treatment would be very similar to that of a
homeowner who sells his house and buys another, and pays no
tax until such time as he sells a house and fails to buy
another. 1011
'

00

I.R.C. § 1034.
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This bill would correct a serious injustice in the tax code
which has created a very unhealthy situation. The principal
owner of a closely-held small business, even a profitable one, frequently experiences difficulty in finding a buyer for his shares
when the time comes to retire or to move on to another challenge. One option open to the owner is to merge into a conglomerate, taking conglomerate shares in return for his own; another
option would be to sell the owner's shares to an ESOP, as described earlier in this article. The tax treatment of these two
options is highly discriminatory in favor of going the conglomerate route. The seller, who pays no tax at the time of this transaction, gets a "tax-free rollover" as described above, and is not
taxed until the sale of the conglomerate shares received in the
exchange. By contrast, the owner who sells shares to an ESOP is
taxed immediately. With such a difference in tax treatment, it is
little wonder that there are so many more conglomerate mergers
than there are sales to ESOP's.
While not all conglomerate mergers are necessaily bad, the
questions raised by the recent House Small Business Committee
Report on Conglomerate Mergers-Their Effect on Small Business and Local Communities 106 and other studies have strongly
indicated that, at the very least, it is bad public policy to favor
conglomerate mergers over sales to ESOP's. The ESOP Improvements Act would help to correct this discrimination. And
because it is a deferral rather than a forgiveness of taxation, it
would also have a very small revenue impact-only about $25
million, according to the Treasury Department. 107 A case can be
made that this one small change would represent a quantum
leap in the attractiveness of the ESOP to the small businessman,
and would cause the creation of thousands of new ESOP's. The
ability to take money out of a corporation tax-free, coupled with
the productivity· and financing advantages of the ESOP, should
make it almost irresistible to many open-minded small businessmen. Furthermore, the requirement that the proceeds be reinvested in another small business will create a large pool of capital actively searching for small businesses in which to invest,
promoting yet another important public policy. Dollar-for-dollar, this proposal may prove to be the most powerful incentive
that Congress could fashion to broaden the ownership of AmeriH.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 48.
,.., Letter from John G. Wilkins, Deputy Dir., Off. of Tax Analysis, Off. of the Secretary of the Treasury, to Mr. Corey Rosen, Sen. Select Comm. on Small Business, February 22, 1980 (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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can capital in the 1980's.
There are two ways in which the attractiveness of this provision could be enhanced even further. One such way would be to
permit rollover into a Small Business Investment Company
("SBIC") in addition to rollover into another small business.
The SBIC 108 securities would provide a high degree of liquidity
for the investor, and the flow of funds into SBIC's would be
channeled into an increased capital pool for small businesses.
Another, much more ambitious approach would be to permit rollover on the sale of any stock to an ESOP, if the proceeds are
reinvested in a small business or an SBIC. Offering this advantage to stockholders of America's major corporations would put
great pressure on those corporations to form ESOP's so that
stockholders could take advantage of the rollover provision. It
would also generate a tremendous flow of funds into the small
business sector. Since small business creates the vast majority of
new American jobs,109 this capital influx could go a long way toward easing persistently high national unemployment.
Other bills were proposed in 1980 that would extend rollover
treatment to all sales of small business stock, with appropriate
reinvestment of proceeds. 110 Needless to say, the revenue impact
of this proposal would be quite a bit larger-twenty-eight times
larger, according to the Treasury Department. 111 Congress
should restrict this favorable treatment to sales to ESOP's in
order to maximize its value. Across-the-board rollover would do
little if anything to broaden ownership, and broadening ownership, as the Joint Economic Committee has stated, must be an
important priority in the 1980's.
CONCLUSION

This article discussed six proposals regarding changes in the
law affecting ESOP's, each of which has at least some merit. It is
important to note, however, that each of them deals with a provision of tax law-either the tax qualification requirements of
the ESOP, or additional tax incentives that might be offered to
companies who set one up. The simple reason for this concentration is that the champion of ESOP on Capitol Hill has been Sen.
15 U.S.C. §§ 681-94(b) (1976).
126 CONG. REc. S10020 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (statement of Sen. Long).
110
See, e.g., S. 653, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).
111
Memorandum to Joint Tax Comm. from Peter Davis (July 12, 1979) (on file with
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Russell Long, former Chairman of the Senate's tax-writing committee. But the ESOP is not and was never intended to be primarily a tax gimmick. The ESOP is much more than that-it is
a way of restructuring the system of capital credit so that it
works with a degree of justice and efficiency unheard of today.
Tax laws are only one element affecting the structure of the capital credit system. Ultimately, perhaps soon, the question of
credit and who should get it will have to be dealt with in a more
direct manner.
Ideally, tax laws should be designed to raise revenue, not to
implement social policy. If it is a desirable social policy to
restructure the system of capital credit so that more people may
have access to it, then that policy should be implemented directly and not by tinkering with the tax laws. Part of the problem with using a more direct approach has been the mystique
surrounding the term "credit allocation." Credit allocation is a
pernicious doctrine, argues the Federal Reserve and others, that
must never be allowed to creep into national policy. Yet the fact
of the matter is that we already have a highly structured system
for allocating capital credit. Simply put, capital credit is allocated to people who have the money to pay for it. People who do
not fit into this category, as a general rule, cannot get it. The
allocation system is quite rigid on this point.
Capital credit is quite different from other types of credit, e.g.,
credit used to finance the acquisition of consumer goods and services. Unlike consumer credit, capital credit pays for itself. It
therefore ought to be possible-even easy-to devise a method
for extending it to people who lack the financial means to pay
for it. Unfortunately, our present system of credit allocation
works in the opposite direction, and channels capital credit toward the people who need it the least.
Such was not always the case. In the 19th century, when land
represented the principal form of capital, America had a conscious policy of spreading access to the ownership of capital as
broadly as possible. Had present thinking been prevalent then,
the West would undoubtedly have been carved up into vast
feudal estates owned by a handful of wealthy Easterners and
Europeans. Instead, under the Homestead Act and the liberal
land policies which preceded it, America became a nation of independent capital owning families, and achieved a prosperity
unheard of prior to that time. An "Industrial Homestead Act"
for the 1980's would have to focus on the central controller of
the capital credit system, the Federal Reserve. By establishing a
two-tiered discount rate, with a lower tier directed toward fos-
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tering broadly-owned new capital, the Federal Reserve could
move forcefully toward a re-allocation of capital credit along
more rational lines. 112
What are the prospects for the ESOP, and the broadened
ownership movement of which it is a part, in the 1980's? The
answer is far from clear. Russell Long will no longer be chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, where he was able to do so
much to promote the cause. On the other hand, President
Reagan during the campaign on at least one occasion stated the
position as eloquently as anyone ever has:
Could there be anything resembling a free enterprise
economy, if wealth and property were concentrated in
the hands of a few, while the great majority owned little
more than the shirts on their backs? ... Could any
country be a land of free men and women, where the
pride and independence of property ownership was reserved to the few, while the majority existed in dependency and servility? It should be clear to everyone that
the nation's steadfast policy should afford every Ameri~
can of working age a realistic opportunity to acquire the
ownership and control of property in a growing national
economy. . . . The nation's next president should call
upon Congressional leaders like Senator Long to work
with him to ensure that all Americans have a fair chance
to become owners of p_roperty. 113

See Kurland, supra note 94.
Reagan-Bush Committee Memorandum, Oct. 31, 1980 (on file with University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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